Prejudicedbeliefsmaycertainlyseemlikedefectivebeliefs.Butinwhatsensearetheydefective?Manywillbefalseandharmful,butphilosophershavefurtherarguedthatprejudicedbeliefisdefectivealsointhesensethatitcouldonlyarisefromdistinctivekindsofepistemicirrationality:wecouldacquireorretainourprejudicedbeliefsonlybyviolatingourepistemicresponsibilities.Itisalsoassumedthatweareonlymorallyresponsiblefortheharmsthatprejudicedbeliefscausebecause,informingthesebeliefsinthefirstplace,weareviolatingourepistemicresponsibilities.InPrejudice,EndreBegbyarguesthatthesecommonconvictionsaremisguided.Hisdiscussionshowsindetailthattherearemanyepistemicallyjustifiedpathwaystoprejudicedbelief,andthatitisamistaketoleanontheconceptofepistemicresponsibilitytoarticulateourethicalresponsibilities.Doingsounreasonablyburdensvictimsofprejudicewithhavingtoshowthattheirvictimizerswereinapositiontoknowbetter.Accordingly,Begbyprovidesanaccountofmoralresponsibilityforharmwhichdoesnotdependonfindinggroundsforepistemicblame.Thisviewissupportedbyanumberofexamplesandcasestudiesatindividual,collective,andinstitutionallevelsofdecisionmaking.Additionally,Begbydevelopsasystematicplatformfor“non-idealepistemology“whichwouldapplytoawiderangeofothersocialandepistemicphenomenaofcurrentconcern,suchasfakenews,conspiracytheories,sciencescepticism,andmore.
